The Commens Dictionary

Quote from ‘Pragmatism’


I do not deny that a concept, or general mental sign, may be a logical interpretant; only, it cannot be the ultimate logical interpretant, precisely because being a sign, it has itself a logical interpretant. It partakes somewhat of the nature of a verbal definition, and is very inferior to the living definition that grows up in the habit. Consequently, the most perfect account of a concept will consist in a description of the habit it will produce; and how otherwise can a habit be described than by a general statement of the kind of action it will give rise to under described circumstances?

MS [R] 318:76
‘Ultimate Logical Interpretant’ (pub. 14.10.15-15:57). Quote in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition. Retrieved from
Oct 14, 2015, 15:57 by Mats Bergman