# The Commens Dictionary

Quote from ‘Probable Inference’

…that relation of the premissed facts to the concluded fact which is regarded as making the former a sign of the latter [—] may be altogether irrespective of whether the conclusion is recognized or not, yet such that it could not subsist if the concluded fact were not probable; this is probable deduction.

[—]

[Probable deduction] is, by the definition of it, necessary inference. But necessary inference may be applied to probability as its subject-matter; and it then becomes, under another aspect, probable inference. If of an endless series of possible experiences a definite proportion will present a certain character (which is the sort of fact called an objective probability), then it necessarily follows that, foreseen or not, approximately the same proportion of any finite portion of that series will present the same character, either as it is, or when it has been sufficiently extended. This is governed by precisely the same principle as the inductive inference, but applied in the reverse way. The same prescriptions of logic apply as before; but, owing to that being now inferred which was in the other case a premiss, and conversely, it is not here true that the relation of the facts laid down in the premisses to the fact stated in the conclusion, which makes the former significant of the latter, requires the recognition of the conclusion. This is probable deduction. It covers all the ordinary and legitimate applications of the mathematical doctrine of probability.

*The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition*. Retrieved from http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-probable-inference-1.