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Home > Atkins, Richard K. (2016). Peirce on facts and true propositions

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Type: 
Article in Journal
Author: 
Atkins, Richard Kenneth
Title: 
Peirce on facts and true propositions
Year: 
2016
Journal: 
British Journal for the History of Philosophy
Volume: 
24
Issue: 
6
Pages: 
1176-1192
Keywords: 
Truth, Fact, Proposition
Abstract: 
Peirce maintains that facts and propositions are structurally isomorphic. When we understand how Peirce thinks they are isomorphic, we find that a common objection raised against epistemic conceptions of truth – that there are facts beyond the ken of discovery – holds no water against Peirce’s claim that truth is what would be believed after a sufficiently long and rigorous course of inquiry.
ISSN: 
09608788
DOI: 
10.1080/09608788.2016.1185390
Language: 
English