There are various "classical" arguments against abduction as a logic of discovery, especially that 1) abduction is too weak a mode of inference to be of any use, and 2) in basic formulation of abduction the hypothesis is already presupposed to be known, so it is not the way hypotheses are discovered in the first place. In this chapter, it is argued by bringing forth the idea of strategies, that these counter-arguments are weaker than may appear. The concept of strategies suggests, inter alia, that many inferential moves are taken into account at the same time. This is especially important in abductive reasoning, which is basically a very weak mode of inference. The importance of strategic thinking can already be seen in Charles S. Peirce´s early treatments of the topic, and N. R. Hanson´s later writings on abduction although they did not use the concept of "strategies." On the whole, it is argued that the focus should be more on methodological processes, and not only on validity considerations, which have dominated the discussion about abduction.