Home > Pitt, Joseph C. (2005). Hume and Peirce on Belief, Or, Why Belief Should Not be Considered an Epistemic Category
Record in the Commens Bibliography. Retrieved from http://www.commens.org/bibliography/journal_article/pitt-joseph-c-2005-hume-and-peirce-belief-or-why-belief-should-not-be, 01.04.2023.
Title:
Hume and Peirce on Belief, Or, Why Belief Should Not be Considered an Epistemic Category
Journal:
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
Abstract:
Explores the role of belief in connecting knowledge to action. Views of philosophers David Hume and Charles Peirce on the nature and role of belief; Consequences of considering the causal role of belief in epistemology; Solutions to the problem in connecting belief and action.