Nominalism seems natural for defending a decent economy of research. However such a program may and has been achieved by such a strongly realistic pragmatism as the one endorsed by Peirce: he shows that there is no risk of "blocking inquiry", no tension between adopting a cost-benefit program and aiming at truth and knowledge, provided, on the negative side , our economy of research is able to stress the impossible reduction of theoretical matters to vital ones, the impossible assimilation of epistemic virtues to mere ethical virtues; and on the positive side , it is able to embrace a strong conception of normative rationality and epistemic virtues, make room as much to "uberty" degrees of belief, propensities as to validity, full-fledged justifications, absolute certainties and mere practical concerns, and develop a conception of knowledge as a virtuous process of inquiry within a genuine intellectual ethics firmly based on a Critical Commonsensist approach.