From the Robin Catalogue:
A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 1-85, with 81 pp. of variants.
Part I. A reference to CSP’s “New Elements of Mathematics,” for which no publisher could be found, and mention of the loss of CSP’s power of writing about logic in a mathematical way, which, in point of fact, he no longer admires. Part II. On definition, postulate, axiom, corollary, theorem; signs, interpretants, entelechy; theory and practice; real relations and reactions; judgment and proposition; judgment and assertion; belief, affirmation, and judgment; doctrine of signs. Criticism of nominalism. The nature of “law”; event and fact; internal and external causes. Law signifies more than mere uniformity; it involves real connections. An improvement upon the traditional doctrine of causation. Symbols unable to exert force, but do govern things (for they are laws). A symbol signifies what it does, as in the feeling of “having been in a present situation before” - a case of accident, not of inherent necessity. Symbols as having grades of directness to the limit of being their own significations, and as having the power to reproduce themselves and to cause real facts. Reality as the limit of the endless series of symbols. Symbols and language, with language unable to provide a basis for logic. “How the constitution of the human mind may compel men to think is not the question; and the appeal to language appears to me to be no better than an unsatisfactory method of ascertaining psychological facts that are of no relevancy to logic. But if such appeal is to be made (and logicians generally do make it, in particular their doctrine of the copula appears to rest solely upon this) it would seem that they ought to survey human languages generally and not confine themselves to the small and extremely peculiar group of Aryan speech.”
Published as NEM 4:235-63; EP 2:300-324.