From the Robin Catalogue:

A. MS., G-c.1907-1a and G-c.1907-1c, with no single, consecutive, complete draft, but several partial drafts end and are signed (Charles Santiago Sanders Peirce) on pp. 34, 77, and 86.
An article in the form of a letter to the editor of The Nation was published as follows: 5.11-13 (pp. 1-7); 5.464-496 (pp. 7-45 of one draft and pp. 46-87 of another; the last two sentences of 5.481 were spliced by the editors of the Collected Papers). Also published as 1.560-562 were pp. 20-27 of still another draft. Omitted from publication: an analysis of James’s definition of “pragmatism” (pp. 10-13 of one of the alternative sections). James’s pragmatism again, followed by a discussion of his own position; the two distinct opponents of pragmatism (Absolutists and Positivistic Nominalists); pragmatism and religion; law distinguished from brute fast, not, as the nominalists would have it, by being a product of the human mind, but, as the realists assert, by being a real intellectual ingredient of the universe; triadic predicates as always having an intellectual basis, the evidence for which is inductive; thoughts regarded as signs, with signs functioning triadically; three kinds of interpretants emotional, energetic, and logical; the distinction between association and suggestion; the syllogism as an associative suggestion; “corollarial” and “theoric” reasoning, of which an example of theoric deduction is the “Ten Point Theorem” of Van Standt (pp. 10-56 of a long draft from which pp. 20-27 were published). The three kinds of interpretants of signs; ultimate intellectual interpretants; pragmatism and common sense, with the meaning of critical common sense explained (pp. 43-59 of an alternative section of the long draft numbered 10-56 and described above). Kernel of pragmatism; concepts equated with mental signs; the object and interpretant of a sign distinguished; the problem of ultimate, or “naked,” meaning; existential meanings; the meaning of an intellectual concept; qualities of feeling as meanings of signs, where qualities are neither thoughts nor existential events; the distinction between real and immediate (as represented by a sign) object, with immediate objects resembling emotional meaning and real objects corresponding to existential meaning; mathematical concepts as examples of logical meaning; the relationship of logical meaning to desires and habits (pp. 11-34 of another alternative section). Object and interpretant (meaning); the different units of interpretants (meanings); pragmatic definition and a prediction that pragmatism will occupy the same position in philosophy as the doctrine of limits occupies in mathematics (pp. 14-25 of an alternative section of the one described immediately above). Kernel of pragmatism; theory of signs; by inference a sign first comes to be recognized as such; the elementary modes of inference (pp. 12-30 of an alternative section). The divisions of geometry; a problem in topics; the Census Theorem and Listing Numbers; the function of consciousness; concepts and habits; the vulnerability of James and Schiller arising from their (apparent) denial of infinity, including an infinite Being (pp. 62-77 of still another alternative section). An attempt to define “sign”; the sense in which utterer and interpreter are essential to signs; the immediate and real objects of signs; a brief note on the Census Theorem (pp. 12-90, with the exception of pp. 46-87 which were published).

Published (partially) as EP 2:398-433.