In 2005, we published a jointly authored article arguing that pragmatists must reject pluralism. As certain pragmatists describe themselves as pluralists, the essay received its share of criticism; however, no response has succeeded in defeating the essay's argument. Nonetheless, contemporary classical pragmatists persist in embracing the term. Something's amiss. In this article, we defend a conclusion that differs importantly from that of the 2005 paper. We will show that pragmatism is consistent with a view that we call modest epistemological pluralism. Thus, pragmatists can be pluralists. However, contemporary classicalists should beware. Our argument shows that pragmatism and pluralism are consistent, not that they are intrinsically allied. More importantly, the modest epistemological pluralism is not the pluralism that contemporary classicalists seem most eager to embrace. The argument proceeds in six steps. First, we dispense with a common but unacceptable conception of pluralism. Second, we identify what pluralism must assert. Third, we distinguish different varieties of pluralism. Fourth, we argue that pragmatists must reject all pluralisms except for what we term modest epistemological pluralism. Fifth, we discuss the prospects for pragmatist-friendly modest epistemological pluralism. Finally, we address the concern that modest epistemological pluralism is not practically distinguishable from monism.