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**Abstract:** C.S. Peirce held what is nowadays called a 'commitment view' of assertion. According to this type of view, assertion is a kind of act that is determined by its 'normative effects': by asserting a proposition one undertakes certain commitments, typically to be able to provide reason to believe what one is asserting, or, in Peirce's words, one 'takes responsibility' for the truth of the proposition one asserts. Despite the fact that Peirce was an early proponent of the view, if his commitment view of assertion is mentioned at all in contemporary discussions it is only in passing. His view is, however, far more complex and nuanced than he has been given credit for. My primary goal here, then, is to get a better understanding of Peirce's version of a commitment view of assertion. I then argue that figuring out the details of Peirce's theory of assertion can provide us with a viable way to respond to certain problems faced by contemporary commitment views of assertion.

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