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**Abstract:** In his Logical Investigations Edmund Husserl criticizes John Stuart Mill's account of meaning as connotation, especially Mill's failure to separate the distinction between connotative and non-connotative names from the distinction between the meaningful and the meaningless. According to Husserl, both connotative and non-connotative names have meaning or "signification", that is, what Gottlob Frege calls the sense ("Sinn") of an expression. The distinction between connotative and non-connotative names is a distinction between two kinds of meaning (or sense), attributive and non-attributive meaning ("attributive und nicht-attributive Bedeutung"). Attributive (connotative) names denote (refer to) objects through their attributes, whereas a non-attributive name means a thing directly ("direkt"). In this paper I examine the concepts of attributive and non-attributive meaning by means of the semiotic theory of Charles S. Peirce, and compare Peirce's account with the views of Frege, Husserl, Alexius Meinong, and David Kaplan and Gareth Evans.

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