

'Belief' (pub. 20.03.13-19:49). Quote in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), *The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition*. Retrieved from <http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-cambridge-lectures-reasoning-and-logic-things-philosophy-and-conduct-life-4>.

Term: Belief

Quote: Hence, I hold that what is properly and usually called *belief*, that is, the adoption of a proposition as a {ktéma es aei} to use the energetic phrase of Doctor Carus, has no place in science at all. We *believe* the proposition we are ready to act upon. *Full belief* is willingness to act upon the proposition in vital crises, *opinion* is willingness to act upon it in relatively insignificant affairs. But pure science has nothing at all to do with *action*. The propositions it accepts, it merely writes in the list of premisses it proposes to use. Nothing is *vital* for science; nothing can be. Its accepted propositions, therefore, are but opinions at most; and the whole list is provisional. The scientific man is not in the least wedded to his conclusions.

Source: Peirce, C. S. (1898). *Cambridge Lectures on Reasoning and the Logic of Things: Philosophy and the Conduct of Life*. MS [R] 437.

References: CP 1.635

Date of 1898

Quote:

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