
**Term:** Relation

**Quote:** I have, since 1870, written much about the logic of relations. In those writings, I have *usually* restricted the terms “relations” and “relationships” to *existential* relations and relationships. By a relationship I understand the conception of a fact about a set of things abstracted from the representation of the things themselves or, in other words, a predicate which requires more than one subject to complete a proposition, or conception of a fact. A “relation” only differs from a “relationship” in that one of the subjects is regarded as being taken account of first, and is usually called the *subject nominative*, while the others are called the *direct* and *indirect objects*. In other words a relation is a predicate requiring one subject nominative and one or more objects in a definite sequence. In my earlier papers I use the conception of relation chiefly; in my later ones that of relationship. The difference is little more than trifling.


**References:** CP 6.318

**Date of Quote:** 1907

**URL:** http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-fourth-curiosity-9