

'Hypothesis [as a form of reasoning]' (pub. 02.02.13-17:12). Quote in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), *The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition*. Retrieved from <http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-harvard-lectures-logic-science-lecture-x-grounds-induction-2>.

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**Term:** Hypothesis [as a form of reasoning]

**Quote:** But the manner in which they have attained to certainty indicates a very different general strength of the three kinds of inference. [—] Thus we have in order of strength Deduction, Induction, Hypothesis. Deduction, in fact, is the only demonstration; yet no one thinks of questioning a good induction, while hypothesis is proverbially dangerous. *Hypotheses non fingo*, said Newton, striving to place his theory on a basis of strict induction. Yet it is hypotheses with which we must start; the baby when he lies turning his fingers before his eyes is making a hypothesis as to the connection of what he sees and what he feels. Hypotheses give us our facts. Induction extends our knowledge. Deduction makes it distinct.

**Source:** Peirce, C. S. (1865). *Harvard Lectures on the Logic of Science. Lecture X: Grounds of Induction*. MS [W] 106; MS [R] 347.

**References:** W 1:283

**Date of** 1865

**Quote:**

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