'Categories' (pub. 06.02.13-19:06). Quote in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), *The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition*. Retrieved from http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-harvard-lectures-pragmatism-lecture-ii-2.

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| **Term:** | Categories |
| **Quote:** | A very moderate exercise of this third faculty suffices to show us that the word *Category* bears substantially the same meaning with all philosophers. For Aristotle, for Kant, and for Hegel, a category is an element of phenomena of the first rank of generality. It naturally follows that the categories are few in number, just as the chemical elements are. The business of phenomenology is to draw up a catalogue of categories and prove its sufficiency and freedom from redundancies, to make out the characteristics of each category, and to show the relations of each to the others. I find that there are at least two distinct orders of categories, which I call the particular and the universal. The particular categories form a series, or set of series, only one of each series being present, or at least predominant, in any one phenomenon. The universal categories, on the other hand, belong to every phenomenon, one being perhaps more prominent in one aspect of that phenomenon than another but all of them belonging to every phenomenon. I am not very well satisfied with this description of the two orders of categories, but I am pretty well satisfied that there are two orders. |
| **Source:** | Peirce, C. S. (1903). *Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture II*. MS [R] 305. |
| **References:** | CP 5.43 |
| **Date of Quote:** | 1903 |
| **URL:** | http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-harvard-lectures-pragmatism-lecture-ii-2 |