<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term:</th>
<th>Chance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quote:</td>
<td>[A] concept cognate with that of probability is the concept of “chance”; which non-pragmatists have, by very loose thinking, identified with ignorance of conditions. The pragmatist will say that it consists in a variety of results with no corresponding and definitely known variety of conditions. It is divisible into apparent, or “subjective”, chance (though the word “subjective” is objectionable,) where a variety of conditions is supposed to be known in a general way, though not singly, and real, or “objective” chance, where there is no reason to suppose any variety in the conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References:</td>
<td>MS [R] 319:16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date of Quote:</td>
<td>1907</td>
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<tr>
<td>URL:</td>
<td><a href="http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-pragmatism-86">http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-pragmatism-86</a></td>
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