<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term:</th>
<th>Real</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quote:</td>
<td>For what is it for a thing to be Real? [—] To say that a thing is Real is merely to say that such predicates as are true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual person or persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality in that single respect constitutes what we call Reality. Consequently, any habit, or lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject of it would, under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is Real, provided this be true whether actual persons think so or not; and it must be admitted to be a Real Habit, even if those conditions never actually do get fulfilled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source:</td>
<td>Peirce, C. S. (1911 [c.]). A Sketch of Logical Critics. MS [R] 675.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References:</td>
<td>EP 2:457-458</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date of Quote:</td>
<td>1911</td>
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<tr>
<td>URL:</td>
<td><a href="http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-sketch-logical-critics-1">http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-sketch-logical-critics-1</a></td>
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