'Hypothesis [as a form of reasoning]' (pub. 03.02.13-17:26). Quote in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), *The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition*. Retrieved from http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-some-consequences-four-incapacities-0.

Term: Hypothesis [as a form of reasoning]

Quote: Thus an emotion is always a simple predicate substituted by an operation of the

mind for a highly complicated predicate. Now if we consider that a very complex predicate demands explanation by means of an hypothesis, that that hypothesis must be a simpler predicate substituted for that complex one; and that when we have an emotion, an hypothesis, strictly speaking, is hardly possible – the analogy of the parts played by emotion and hypothesis is very striking. There is, it is true, this difference between an emotion and an intellectual hypothesis, that we have reason to say in the case of the latter, that to whatever the simple hypothetic predicate can be applied, of that the complex predicate is true; whereas, in the case of an emotion this is a proposition for which no reason can be given, but which is determined merely

by our emotional constitution.

Source: Peirce, C. S. (1868). Some Consequences of Four Incapacities. *Journal of*

Speculative Philosophy, 2, 140-157.

References: CP 5.292

Date of 1868

Quote:

URL: http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-some-consequences-four-incap

acities-0