

'Dicisign' (pub. 17.04.13-19:57). Quote in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), *The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition*. Retrieved from <http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-syllabus-syllabus-course-lectures-lowell-institute-beginning-1903-nov-23-s-11>.

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**Term:** Dicisign

**Quote:** The second trichotomy of representamens is [divided] into: first, simple signs, substitutive signs, or *Sumisigns*; second, double signs, informational signs, quasi-propositions, or *Dicisigns*; third, triple signs, rationally persuasive signs, *arguments*, or *Suadisigns*.

[—]

The readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign is a Dicisign or not is that a Dicisign is either true or false, but does not directly furnish reasons for its being so. This shows that a Dicisign must profess to refer or relate to something as having a real being independently of the representation of it as such, and further that this reference or relation must not be shown as rational, but must appear as a blind Secondness. But the only kind of sign whose object is necessarily existent is the genuine Index. This Index might, indeed, be a part of a Symbol; but in that case the relation would appear as rational. Consequently a Dicisign necessarily represents itself to be a genuine Index, and to be nothing more.

**Source:** Peirce, C. S. (1903). *Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic*. MS [R] 478.

**References:** EP 2:275-276

**Date of** 1903

**Quote:**

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