

'Fact' (pub. 04.06.14-20:23). Quote in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), *The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition*. Retrieved from <http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-syllabus-syllabus-course-lectures-lowell-institute-beginning-1903-nov-23-s-21>.

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**Term:** Fact

**Quote:** Among the familiar ideas of logic in which the element of Secondness is predominant, may be mentioned, in the first place, the conception of a *fact*. The easiest definition of a Fact is that it is an abstract element of the real, corresponding to a proposition. But this needlessly introduces the element of Thirdness; but it can be prescinded from it. ... A Fact may be defined as the Secondness which consists between anything and a possibility, or Firstness, realized in that thing.

**Source:** Peirce, C. S. (1903). *Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic*. MS [R] 478.

**References:** EP 2:270-271

**Date of** 1903

**Quote:**

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