

Argument

1898 | On Existential Graphs | MS [R] 484:8

An *argument* is a bad name for a symbol in which the representative element, or reason, is distinctly expressed. It may be used either to produce belief or in various ways.

1899-1900 [c.] | Notes on Topical Geometry | MS [R] 142:6

Symbols are of three classes: *terms*, which call attention to things or quasi-things; *propositions*, which declare facts; and *arguments*, which profess to enlighten us as to the rational connections of facts or possible facts.

1901-1902 [c.] | Definitions for Baldwin's Dictionary [R] | MS [R] 1147

An argument may be defined as a symbol which definitely and separately shows what interpretant, or *conclusion*, it aims at.

1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter I. Intended Characters of this Treatise | CP 2.95

An *Argument* is a sign which distinctly represents the Interpretant, called its *Conclusion*, which it is intended to determine.

1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter I. Intended Characters of this Treatise | MS [R] 425:119

An Argument is a Sign which aims to determine a definite Interpretant, called its Conclusion. It must, a *fortiori*, have a definite subject.

From an early/discarded draft

1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 597:2

...an argument is a communication by which the arguer endeavours to produce a predetermined belief in the mind he addresses.

1903 | A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic | EP 2:292

An *Argument* is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a sign of law. Or we may say [...] that an Argument is a Sign which is understood to represent its Object in its character as Sign.

1903 | A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic | EP 2:296

An Argument is a sign whose interpretant represents its object as being an ulterior sign through a law, namely, the law that the passage from all such premisses to such conclusions tends to the truth. Manifestly, then, its object must be general; that is, the Argument must be a Symbol. As a Symbol it must, further, be a Legisign. Its Replica is a Dicent Sinsign.

1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture V | EP 2:204

A representamen is either a *rhema*, a *proposition*, or an *argument*. An *argument* is a representamen which separately shows what interpretant it is intended to determine. A *proposition* is a representamen which is not an argument, but which separately indicates what object it is intended to represent. A *rhema* is a simple representation without such separate parts.

1903 [c.] | Logical Tracts. No. 1. On Existential Graphs | MS [R] 491:9

An *argument* is a symbol which specially shows what interpretant it is intended to determine...

1903 [c.] | P of L | MS [R] 800:6

An *argument* is a sign whose proper interpretant represents it as a sign. In order that the proper interpretant may do this, the argument must have separate parts representing the sign[,] its object & its interpretant.

1904 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 34

I [...] define an argument as a sign which is represented in its signified interpretant not as a Sign of the interpretant (the conclusion) [for that would be to urge or submit it] but as *if* it were a Sign of the Interpretant or perhaps as if it were a Sign of the state of the universe to which it refers, in which the premisses are taken for granted.

1904 | Foundations of Mathematics [R] | MS [R] 9:1-2

A sign is also intended to determine, in a mind or elsewhere, a sign of the same object; and this *interpretant* of the sign may be the very sign itself; but as a general rule it will be different. It is a perfection in a sign separately to signify its intended interpretant. If it does this, it becomes an *argumentation* or *argument*. (Some pedants insist on the former word; but the very best usage supports the latter.)

1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:308

I have already defined an argument as a sign which separately monstrates what its intended interpretant is, and a proposition as a sign which separately indicates [what] its object is; and we have seen that the icon alone cannot be a proposition while the symbol alone can be an argument. [—] It will be observed that an argument is a symbol which separately monstrates (in any way) its *purposed* interpretant.

1905 | Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature" | MS [R] 939:48-9

In their relations to their Triadic, i.e. intended or adaptational Interpretants, Signs may, 1st, determine those interpretants, merely in the sense that, if the Interpretants represent the Objects as the Signs themselves do they are such Interpretants as are intended. Such is an ideal statuette, and exclamation of surprise, a noun, whether common or proper. 2nd, Signs may be adapted to compelling or tending to compel the determination of their intended interpretants, such is a portrait with the name of the person represented under it, such is a weather-cock in a good breeze. 3rd, Signs may be adapted to determining a particular interpretant logically. Names: *Rheme*, *Dicisign*, *Argument*.

1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538

A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much widened. [—] As the third member of the triplet, I sometimes use the word *Delome* [...], though *Argument* would answer well enough. It is a Sign which has the Form of tending to act upon the Interpreter through his own self-control, representing a process of change in thoughts or signs, as if to induce this change in the Interpreter.

1908 | A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (O) | CP 6.456

An "Argument" is any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief.

1911 | A Logical Critique of Essential Articles of Religious Faith | MS [R] 852:2

An argument [...] is nearly equivalent to “premiss” or “copulate premiss,” i.e. a body of premisses having a single intention, and is a known or pretended fact which is intended to serve as a Sign of the reality of another fact, its *Conclusion*.