...a desire is always general; that is, it is always some *kind* of thing or event which is desired; at least, until the element of will, which is always exercised upon an individual object upon an individual occasion, becomes so predominant as to overrule the generalizing character of desire.

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Closely connected with the fact that every desire is general, are two other facts which must be taken into account in considering purposive classes. The first of these is that a desire is always more or less variable, or vague.

[—]

But not only is desire *general* and *vague*, or indeterminate; it has besides a certain longitude, or *third* dimension. By this I mean that while a certain ideal state of things might most perfectly satisfy a desire, yet a situation somewhat differing from that will be far better than nothing; and in general, when a state is not too far from the ideal state, the nearer it approaches that state the better. Moreover, the situation of things most satisfactory to one desire is almost never the situation most satisfactory to another.