Discrimination

1867 | On a New List of Categories | W 2:50; CP 1.549

Discrimination has to do merely with the senses of terms, and only draws a distinction in meaning.

1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:270

Separation of Thirdness, or Tertial Separation, called *discrimination*, consists in representing one of the two separands without representing the other. If A can be prescinded from, i.e. supposed without B, then B can, at least, be discriminated from A.

1906 [c.] | On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an Instrument for the Investigation of Logic | MS [R] 499(s)

...one component, B, of the Phaneron may be quite unsupposable (at any rate, by any ordinary mind), without supposing the full and perfect presence of a certain other constituent, A; and yet it may be [that] A may be supposed to be present while B is present in widely varying degrees (or, perhaps sometimes is quite absent). In such a case, we not only get by prescission a concept of A unmixed with B, but we are able to recognize B as a constituent different from its constant and inseparable companion, A. For example, being able to imagine visual surfaces of various colors (or perhaps even colorless, as the boundary between media of widely different indices of refraction; but it is not necessary to resort to such phenomena) we come to recognize color as something quite different from visible superficies, notwithstanding the utter impossibility (for most people) of imagining color without superficial extension. I called this mode of analysis *discrimination*. It is highly important not to lose sight of it.

1908 | The First Part of An Apology for Pragmaticism | LI 373

In a paper published in the *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* for 1867 May 14, I defined the three ways in which an idea can be mentally isolated from another. They [are] *Dissociation, Presciision*, and *Discrimination*. — Discrimination consists in logically supposing the former idea to be absent though the latter is present. Thus, I can discriminate color from space, since I can logically suppose that there is a space that is uncolored.