

Intuition

1868 | Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man | W 2:193; CP 5.213

Throughout this paper, the term *intuition* will be taken as signifying a cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same object, and therefore so determined by something out of the consciousness. Let me request the reader to note this. *Intuition* here will be nearly the same as “premiss not itself a conclusion”; the only difference being that premises and conclusions are judgments, whereas an intuition may, as far as its definition states, be any kind of cognition whatever. But just as a conclusion (good or bad) is determined in the mind of the reasoner by its premise, so cognitions not judgments may be determined by previous cognitions; and a cognition not so determined, and therefore determined directly by the transcendental object, is to be termed an *intuition*.

1895 [c.] | On the Logic of Quantity | MS [R] 17:8

The sensation of a relation as such is called an *intuition*.