

# Judgment

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1873 | Chapter V. That the significance of thought lies in its reference to the future | W 3:107; CP 7.360

In a mind which is capable of logical criticism of its beliefs, there must be a sensation of believing, which shall serve to show what ideas are connected. The recognition that two objects present belong together as one is a judgment. All ideas arise in judgments.

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1880 | On the Algebra of Logic | W 4:164; CP 3.160

A cerebral habit of the highest kind, which will determine what we do in fancy as well as what we do in action, is called a *belief*. The representation to ourselves that we have a specified habit of this kind is called a *judgment*.

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1893-1895 [c.] | Division III. Substantial Study of Logic. Chapter VI. The Essence of Reasoning | MS [R] 409:91; CP 4.53

The actual calling to mind of the substance of a belief, not as personal to ourselves, but as holding good, or true, is a *judgment*.

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1895 | Short Logic: Chapter I. Of Reasoning in General | EP 2:12

An act of consciousness in which a person thinks he recognizes a belief is called a *judgment*. The expression of a judgment is called in logic a *proposition*.

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1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:5

A *judgment* is a mental act by which one makes a resolution to adhere to a proposition as true, with all its logical consequences.

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1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture I | PPM 116; CP 5.29

Do we not all perceive that *judgment* is something closely allied to assertion? That is the view that ordinary speech entertains. A man or woman will be heard to use the phrase, "I say to myself." That is, *judgment* is held to be either no more than an *assertion to oneself* or at any rate something very

like that.

1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:311

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A *proposition* [...] is not to be understood as the lingual expression of a judgment. It is, on the contrary, that sign of which the judgment is one replica and the lingual expression another. But a judgment is distinctly *more* than the mere mental replica of a proposition. It not merely expresses the proposition, but it goes further and *accepts* it.

1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:313

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A *judgment* is a mental act deliberately exercising a force tending to determine in the mind of the agent a belief in the proposition; to which should perhaps be added that the agent must be aware of his being liable to inconvenience in the event of the proposition's proving false in any practical aspect.

1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:324

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The man is a symbol. Different men, so far as they can have any ideas in common, are the same symbol. Judgment is the determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the judged proposition has..

nd | Fragments [R] | MS [R] 839

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A mental proposition is called a judgment.