Judgment

1873 | Chapter V. That the significance of thought lies in its reference to the future | W 3:107; CP 7.360

In a mind which is capable of logical criticism of its beliefs, there must be a sensation of believing, which shall serve to show what ideas are connected. The recognition that two objects present belong together as one is a judgment. All ideas arise in judgments.

1880 | On the Algebra of Logic | W 4:164; CP 3.160

A cerebral habit of the highest kind, which will determine what we do in fancy as well as what we do in action, is called a belief. The representation to ourselves that we have a specified habit of this kind is called a judgment.

1893-1895 [c.] | Division III. Substantial Study of Logic. Chapter VI. The Essence of Reasoning | MS [R] 409:91; CP 4.53

The actual calling to mind of the substance of a belief, not as personal to ourselves, but as holding good, or true, is a judgment.

1895 | Short Logic: Chapter I. Of Reasoning in General | EP 2:12

An act of consciousness in which a person thinks he recognizes a belief is called a judgment. The expression of a judgment is called in logic a proposition.

1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:5

A judgment is a mental act by which one makes a resolution to adhere to a proposition as true, with all its logical consequences.

1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture I | PPM 116; CP 5.29

Do we not all perceive that judgment is something closely allied to assertion? That is the view that ordinary speech entertains. A man or woman will be heard to use the phrase, “I says to myself.” That is, judgment is held to be either no more than an assertion to oneself or at any rate something very
A proposition [...] is not to be understood as the lingual expression of a judgment. It is, on the contrary, that sign of which the judgment is one replica and the lingual expression another. But a judgment is distinctly more than the mere mental replica of a proposition. It not merely expresses the proposition, but it goes further and *accepts* it.

A judgment is a mental act deliberately exercising a force tending to determine in the mind of the agent a belief in the proposition; to which should perhaps be added that the agent must be aware of his being liable to inconvenience in the event of the proposition’s proving false in any practical aspect.

The man is a symbol. Different men, so far as they can have any ideas in common, are the same symbol. Judgment is the determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the judged proposition has.  

A mental proposition is called a judgment.