

Phaneron

1904 [c.] | Logic viewed as Semeiotics. Introduction. Number 2. Phaneroscopy | CP 1.285

English philosophers have quite commonly used the word *idea* in a sense approaching to that which I give to *phaneron*. But in various ways they have restricted the meaning of it too much to cover my conception (if conception it can be called), besides giving a psychological connotation to their word which I am careful to exclude. The fact that they have the habit of saying that “there is no such idea” as this or that, in the very same breath in which they definitely describe the phaneron in question, renders their term fatally inapt for my purpose.

1905 | Letters to William James | NEM 3:834

The *phaneron*, as I now call it, the sum total all of the contents of human consciousness, which I believe is about what you (borrowing the term of Avenarius) call *pure experience*, - but I do not admit the point of view of Avenarius to be correct or to be consonant to any pragmatism, nor to yours, in particular, and therefore I do not like that phrase. For me *experience* is what life has forced upon us, - a vague idea no doubt. But my *phaneron* is not limited to what is *forced* upon us; it also embraces all that we most capriciously conjure up, not *objects* only but all modes of contents of cognitional consciousness.

1905 | Adirondack Summer School Lectures | CP 1.284

Phaneroscopy is the description of the *phaneron*; and by the *phaneron* I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask present *when*, and to *whose* mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds. So far as I have developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron. I know that there is another series of elements imperfectly represented by Hegel’s Categories. But I have been unable to give any satisfactory account of them.

1905 | The Basis of Pragmaticism | EP 2:362

I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to denote the total content of any one consciousness (for any one is substantially any other), the sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of its cognitive value. This is pretty vague: I intentionally leave it

so. I will only point out that I do not limit the reference to an instantaneous state of consciousness; for the clause “in any way whatever” takes in memory and all habitual cognition.

1905 [c.] | Letter draft to Mario Calderoni | CP 8.213

I use the word *phaneron* to mean all that is present to the mind in any sense or in any way whatsoever, regardless of whether it be fact or figment. I examine the phaneron and I endeavor to sort out its elements according to the complexity of their structure. I thus reach my three categories.

1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 284:38

All that is imagined, felt, thought, desired, or that either colors or governs what we feel or think is in some sense before the mind. The sum total of it I will name the *phaneron*.

1906 [c.] | On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an Instrument for the Investigation of Logic | MS [R] 499(s)

Let us call all that ever could be present to the mind in any way or any sense, when taken collectively, the Phaneron. Then every thought is a Constituent of the Phaneron, and much besides that would not ordinarily be called a Thought.

1909 | The Century Dictionary Supplement, Vol. II | CDS 2:978

Whatever is in any sense present to the mind, whatever its cognitive value may be, and whether it be objectified or not. A term proposed by C. S. Peirce in order to avoid loading ‘phenomenon,’ ‘thought,’ ‘idea,’ etc., with multiple meanings.