The broadest division of dyadic relations is into those which can only subsist between two subjects of different categories of being (as between an existing individual and a quality) and those which can subsist between two subjects of the same category. A relation of the former kind may advantageously be termed a *reference*; a relation of the latter kind, a *dyadic relation proper*. 

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Reference

1903 | Nomenclature and Divisions of Dyadic Relations | CP 3.572

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Commens: Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce (http://www.commens.org)