Replica

1903 | Lecture I [R] | MS [R] 450:6

A symbol is employed over and over again, and we call all the occurrences of it occurrences of the same *symbol*. That is to say, it is the general type that makes the symbol, or its being made according to certain general precepts. A word is, therefore, wanted for the single embodiment of the symbol. I will call it a *replica*.

1903 | Syllabus: Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, as far as they are determined | EP 2:291

A *Legisign* is a law that is a Sign. This law is usually established by men. Every conventional sign is a legisign. It is not a single object, but a general type which, it has been agreed, shall be significant. Every legisign signifies through an instance of its application, which may be termed a *Replica* of it. Thus, the word "the" will usually occur from fifteen to twenty-five times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and the same word, the same legisign. Each single instance of it is a replica. The replica is a sinsign.

1903 [c.] | Logical Tracts. No. 1. On Existential Graphs | MS [R] 491:7-8

To the single "occurrences" of a symbol, – which are existent individual *indices* exciting in the mind images, which coalesce to form *icons* of the symbol, – I give the name of its *replicas*.

1903 [c.] | P of L | MS [R] 800:2

...the word ‘the’ occurs, on the average, twenty times on an English page (more or fewer times, according to the style), and all these are so many occurrences of one and the same word. In that sense a word is a ‘legisign.’ But a legisign can only exists in such occurrences, which I term its *replicas*; and each of these *replicas* is a *suisign*.

From a probably discarded page

1904 | Foundations of Mathematics [R] | MS [R] 9:1

A sign is not a real thing. The same sign may occur, or as we may say, can be *uttered*, over and over again. We may call these things embodying the same sign *replicas* of it. They need not be alike
As we use the term ‘word’ in most cases, saying that ‘the’ is one ‘word’ and ‘an’ is a second ‘word,’ a ‘word’ is a legisign. But when we say of a page in a book, that it has 250 ‘words’ upon it, of which twenty are ‘the’s, the ‘word’ is a sinsign. A sinsign so embodying a legisign, I term a ‘replica’ of the legisign.

In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance of the Type.