@article{Wilson2015,
author = "Aaron Bruce Wilson",
title = "{Peirce and the A Priori}",
year = 2015,
journal = "Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society",
volume = 51,
number = "2",
pages = "201-224",
issn = "00091774",
abstract = "{The general inquiry of this paper is whether or not, on Peirces mature architectonic, some knowledge is a priori, understood as knowledge that is epistemically independent of experience. While some scholars have observed a deep skepticism of the a priori in Peirce (e.g., Liszka 1996, Hookway 2012) others have claimed that Peirce held that we know some principles a priori (e.g., Skagestad 1981, Forster 2011). First, I explain a trivial sense in which there is no a priori knowledge in Peirce, a sense that concerns his concept of experience as "the entire mental product"; but I focus the remainder of the paper on whether he supposes that we have knowledge of propositions which cannot, in principle, be refuted by perceptual judgments elicited by sensory percepts (or by what can be known therefrom). I argue that he does not, and that his account of perception might explain how he supposes that even philosophical and mathematical knowledge depends on sense perception. While Peirce holds that some beliefs are innate, he does not hold that these beliefs constitute a priori knowledge.}",
keywords = "A Priori, Knowledge, Perception",
language = "English",
note = "From the Commens Bibliography | \url{http://www.commens.org/bibliography/journal_article/wilson-aaron-bruce-2015-peirce-and-priori}"
}
