Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce
1899-1900 [c.] | Notes on Topical Geometry | MS [R] 142:6

Symbols are of three classes: terms, which call attention to things or quasi-things; propositions, which declare facts; and arguments, which profess to enlighten us as to the rational connections of facts or possible facts.

1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter I. Intended Characters of this Treatise | CP 2.95

An Argument is a sign which distinctly represents the Interpretant, called its Conclusion, which it is intended to determine.

1903 | A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic | EP 2:296

An Argument is a sign whose interpretant represents its object as being an ulterior sign through a law, namely, the law that the passage from all such premisses to such conclusions tends to the truth. Manifestly, then, its object must be general; that is, the Argument must be a Symbol. As a Symbol it must, further, be a Legisign. Its Replica is a Dicent Sinsign.

1903 | A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic | EP 2:292

An Argument is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a sign of law. Or we may say […] that an Argument is a Sign which is understood to represent its Object in its character as Sign.

1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture V | EP 2:204

A representamen is either a rhema, a proposition, or an argument. An argument is a representamen which separately shows what interpretant it is intended to determine. A proposition is a representamen which is not an argument, but which separately indicates what object it is intended to represent. A rhema is a simple representation without such separate parts.

1903 [c.] | Logical Tracts. No. 1. On Existential Graphs | MS [R] 491:9

An argument is a symbol which specially shows what interpretant it is intended to determine

1904 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 34

I […] define an argument as a sign which is represented in its signified interpretant not as a Sign of the interpretant (the conclusion) [for that would be to urge or submit it] but as if it were a Sign of the Interpretant or perhaps as if it were a Sign of the state of the universe to which it refers, in which the premisses are taken for granted.

1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:308

I have already defined an argument as a sign which separately monstrates what its intended interpretant is, and a proposition as a sign which separately indicates [what] its object is; and we have seen that the icon alone cannot be a proposition while the symbol alone can be an argument. [—] It will be observed that an argument is a symbol which separately monstrates (in any way) its purposed interpretant.

1905 | Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature" | MS [R] 939:48-9

In their relations to their Triadic, i.e. intended or adaptational Interpretants, Signs may, 1st, determine those interpretants, merely in the sense that, if the Interpretants represent the Objects as the Signs themselves do they are such Interpretants as are intended. Such is an ideal statuette, and exclamation of surprise, a noun, whether common or proper. 2nd, Signs may be adapted to compelling or tending to compel the determination of their intended interpretants, such is a portrait with the name of the person represented under it, such is a weather-cock in a good breeze. 3rd, Signs may be adapted to determining a particular interpretant logically. Names: Rheme, Dicisign, Argument.

1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538

A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much widened. [—] As the third member of the triplet, I sometimes use the word Delome […], though Argument would answer well enough. It is a Sign which has the Form of tending to act upon the Interpreter through his own self-control, representing a process of change in thoughts or signs, as if to induce this change in the Interpreter.

1908 | A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (O) | CP 6.456

An “Argument” is any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief.

1911 | A Logical Critique of Essential Articles of Religious Faith | MS [R] 852:2

An argument […] is nearly equivalent to “premiss” or “copulate premiss,” i.e. a body of premisses having a single intention, and is a known or pretended fact which is intended to serve as a Sign of the reality of another fact, its Conclusion.

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