Argument   

Argument

Commens
Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce

Cite: ‘Argument’. Term in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition. Retrieved from http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/argument, 23.10.2014.
Argument
1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter I. Intended Characters of this Treatise | CP 2.95

An Argument is a sign which distinctly represents the Interpretant, called its Conclusion, which it is intended to determine.

1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture V | EP 2:204

A representamen is either a rhema, a proposition, or an argument. An argument is a representamen which separately shows what interpretant it is intended to determine. A proposition is a representamen which is not an argument, but which separately indicates what object it is intended to represent. A rhema is a simple representation without such separate parts.

1903 | A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic | EP 2:296

An Argument is a sign whose interpretant represents its object as being an ulterior sign through a law, namely, the law that the passage from all such premisses to such conclusions tends to the truth. Manifestly, then, its object must be general; that is, the Argument must be a Symbol. As a Symbol it must, further, be a Legisign. Its Replica is a Dicent Sinsign.

1903 | A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic | EP 2:292

An Argument is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a sign of law. Or we may say […] that an Argument is a Sign which is understood to represent its Object in its character as Sign.

1904 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 34

I […] define an argument as a sign which is represented in its signified interpretant not as a Sign of the interpretant (the conclusion) [for that would be to urge or submit it] but as if it were a Sign of the Interpretant or perhaps as if it were a Sign of the state of the universe to which it refers, in which the premisses are taken for granted.

1904 (c.) | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:308

… defined an argument as a sign which separately monstrates what its intended interpretant is, and a proposition as a sign which separately indicates [what] its object is.

1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538

A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much widened. [—] As the third member of the triplet, I sometimes use the word Delome […], though Argument would answer well enough. It is a Sign which has the Form of tending to act upon the Interpreter through his own self-control, representing a process of change in thoughts or signs, as if to induce this change in the Interpreter.

1908 | A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (O) | CP 6.456

An “Argument” is any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief.

1911 | A Logical Critique of Essential Articles of Religious Faith | MS [R] 852:2

An argument […] is nearly equivalent to “premiss” or “copulate premiss,” i.e. a body of premisses having a single intention, and is a known or pretended fact which is intended to serve as a Sign of the reality of another fact, its Conclusion.


Cite: ‘Argument’. Term in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition. Retrieved from http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/argument, 23.10.2014.
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