Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce
1903 | Lowell Lectures. 1903. Lecture 3 | MS [R] 459:29-30

These substantive possibilities, – that is, qualities, relations, and the like, – are prior to existence, in the sense that non-existence is not a necessary proof of non-possibility, but non-possibility is a necessary proof of non-existence. For it is logically impossible that existence should exhaust pure possibilities of any kind. These truths are strictly deducible from the facts of phenomenology, or the analysis of the phenomenon; meaning by the phenomenon whatever is present in the mind in any kind of thought.

1903 | Lowell Lectures on Some Topics of Logic Bearing on Questions Now Vexed. Part 1 of 3rd draught of 3rd Lecture | MS [R] 464:28

Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or cognition of any kind. Everything that you can possibly think involves three kinds of elements.

1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:259; CP 1.186

Philosophy is divided into (a) Phenomenology; (b) Normative Science; (c) Metaphysics.

Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally present in the phenomenon; meaning by the phenomenon, whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way.

1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | MS [R] 478:5-6

…a Phenomenon, that is to say, anything that can emerge in knowledge or in fancy, has in the first place its own peculiar smell, apart from any reflexion or comparisons. But in the second place, the coming of this phenomenon is an event. It strikes me, and I am conscious that it insists on recognition. That consciousness of insistence betrays the fact that I have in conservatism resisted it. For force without reaction cannot be. Perhaps I even will it to be otherwise; and if so it will be the Phenomenon that will resist. This element is what we chiefly have in mind when we talk of experience, which is so much of a cognitive character as insists on sticking. The only remaining element of the Phenomenon is Thought. If we will to alter the phenomenon, we have to make some representation to ourselves of what we propose to do. This is thought. All representation is this third element.