Pragmatism   

Pragmatism

Commens
Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce

Cite: ‘Pragmatism’. Term in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition. Retrieved from http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/pragmatism, 16.12.2014.
Pragmatism
1902 (c.) | Peirce's Personal Interleaved Copy of the 'Century Dictionary' [Commens] | CP 5.13 n. 1

Pragmatism is a method in philosophy. Philosophy is that branch of positive science (i.e., an investigating theoretical science which inquires what is the fact, in contradistinction to pure mathematics which merely seeks to know what follows from certain hypotheses) which makes no observations but contents itself with so much of experience as pours in upon every man during every hour of his waking life. The study of philosophy consists, therefore, in reflexion, and pragmatism is that method of reflexion which is guided by constantly holding in view its purpose and the purpose of the ideas it analyzes, whether these ends be of the nature and uses of action or of thought.

[—] It will be seen that pragmatism is not a Weltanschauung but is a method of reflexion having for its purpose to render ideas clear.

1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture I | CP 5.18

Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in the imperative mood.

1903 | C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd Draught of 3rd Lecture | MS [R] 462:42

There is a logical doctrine called Pragmatism. It is the doctrine that what any word or thought means consists in what it can contribute to an expectation about future experience, and nothing more.

1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture I | CP 5.33

What the pragmatist has his pragmatism for is to be able to say: here is a definition and it does not differ at all from your confusedly apprehended conception because there is no practical difference. But what is to prevent his opponent from replying that there is a practical difference which consists in his recognizing one as his conception and not the other? That is, one is expressible in a way in which the other is not expressible.

Pragmatism is completely volatilized if you admit that sort of practicality.

1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture II | CP 5.64

What the true definition of Pragmatism may be, I find it very hard to say; but in my nature it is a sort of instinctive attraction for living facts.

1904 (c.) | A draft of a review of Herbert Nichols' A Treatise on Cosmology, Vol. 1 [CP] | CP 8.191

The word pragmatism was invented to express a certain maxim of logic, which, as was shown at its first enouncement, involves a whole system of philosophy. The maxim is intended to furnish a method for the analysis of concepts. A concept is something having the mode of being of a general type which is, or may be made, the rational part of the purport of a word. A more precise or fuller definition cannot here be attempted. The method prescribed in the maxim is to trace out in the imagination the conceivable practical consequences, – that is, the consequences for deliberate, self-controlled conduct, – of the affirmation or denial of the concept; and the assertion of the maxim is that herein lies the whole of the purport of the word, the entire concept. The sedulous exclusion from this statement of all reference to sensation is specially to be remarked.

1905 | What Pragmatism Is | CP 5.412

… he [the writer of this article] framed the theory that a conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it. For this doctrine he invented the name pragmatism. [—] Now quite the most striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational purpose; and that consideration it was which determined the preference for the name pragmatism.

1905 (c.) | (Prag) [R] | CP 5.5-6

… Pragmatism was not a theory which special circumstances had led its authors to entertain. It had been designed and constructed, to use the expression of Kant, architectonically. Just as a civil engineer, before erecting a bridge, a ship, or a house, will think of the different properties of all materials, and will use no iron, stone, or cement, that has not been subjected to tests; and will put them together in ways minutely considered, so, in constructing the doctrine of pragmatism the properties of all indecomposable concepts were examined and the ways in which they could be compounded. Then the purpose of the proposed doctrine having been analyzed, it was constructed out of the appropriate concepts so as to fulfill that purpose. In this way, the truth of it was proved. There are subsidiary confirmations of its truth; but it is believed that there is no other independent way of strictly proving it.

But first, what is its purpose? What is it expected to accomplish? It is expected to bring to an end those prolonged disputes of philosophers which no observations of facts could settle, and yet in which each side claims to prove that the other side is in the wrong. Pragmatism maintains that in those cases the disputants must be at cross-purposes. They either attach different meanings to words, or else one side or the other (or both) uses a word without any definite meaning. What is wanted, therefore, is a method for ascertaining the real meaning of any concept, doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign.

1905 (c.) | (Prag) [R] | CP 5.8

… pragmatism does not undertake to say in what the meanings of all signs consist, but merely to lay down a method of determining the meanings of intellectual concepts, that is, of those upon which reasonings may turn.

1905 (c.) | Letter draft to Mario Calderoni | CP 8.205-6

In the April number of the Monist [‘What Pragmatism Is’, 1905] I proposed that the word ‘pragmatism’ should hereafter be used somewhat loosely to signify affiliation with Schiller, James, Dewey, Royce, and the rest of us, while the particular doctrine which I invented the word to denote, which is your first kind of pragmatism, should be called ‘pragmaticism.’ The extra syllable will indicate the narrower meaning.

Pragmaticism is not a system of philosophy. It is only a method of thinking…

1907 | Pragmatism | EP 2:400-401

… pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially assent to that statement. As to the ulterior and indirect effects of practising the pragmatistic method, that is quite another affair.

All pragmatists will further agree that their method of ascertaining the meanings of words and concepts is no other than that experimental method by which all the successful sciences (in which number nobody in his senses would include metaphysics) have reached the degrees of certainty that are severally proper to them today; - this experimental method being itself nothing but a particular application of an older logical rule, ‘By their fruits ye shall know them.’

1907 | Pragmatism | EP 2:401-402

I understand pragmatism to be a method of ascertaining the meanings, not of all ideas, but only of what I call ‘intellectual concepts,’ that is to say, of those upon the structure of which, arguments concerning objective fact may hinge. [—] My pragmatism, having nothing to do with qualities of feeling, permits me to hold that the predication of such a quality is just what it seems, and has nothing to do with anything else. Hence, could two qualities of feeling everywhere be interchanged, nothing but feelings could be affected. Those qualities have no intrinsic significations beyond themselves. Intellectual concepts, however, - the only sign-burdens that are properly denominated ‘concepts,’ - essentially carry some implication concerning the general behaviour either of some conscious being or of some inanimate object, and so convey more, not merely than any feeling, but more, too, than any existential fact, namely, the ‘would-acts’ of habitual behaviour; and no agglomeration of actual happenings can ever completely fill up the meaning of a ‘would-be.’ But that the total meaning of the predication of an intellectual concept consists in affirming that, under all conceivable circumstances of a given kind, the subject of the predication would (or would not) behave in a certain way, - that is, that it either would, or would not, be true that under given experiential circumstances (or under a given proportion of them, taken as they would occur in experience) certain facts would exist, - that proposition I take to be the kernel of pragmatism. More simply stated, the whole meaning of an intellectual predicate is that certain kinds of events would happen, once in so often, in the course of experience, under certain kinds of existential circumstances.

1910 (c.) | Additament to the Article A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God | CP 6.490

According to that logical doctrine which the present writer first formulated in 1873 and named Pragmatism, the true meaning of any product of the intellect lies in whatever unitary determination it would impart to practical conduct under any and every conceivable circumstance, supposing such conduct to be guided by reflexion carried to an ultimate limit. It appears to have been virtually the philosophy of Socrates. But although it is “an old way of thinking,” in the sense that it was practiced by Spinoza, Berkeley, and Kant, I am not aware of its having been definitely formulated, whether as a maxim of logical analysis or otherwise, by anybody before my publication of it in 1878. [—] It did not, however, shine with its present effulgence until Professor Papini made the discovery that it cannot be defined - a circumstance which, I believe, distinguishes it from all other doctrines, of whatsoever natures they may be, that were ever promulgated. Thereupon I thought it high time to give my method a less distinguished designation; and I rechristened it pragmaticism. Pragmaticism, then, is a theory of logical analysis, or true definition; and its merits are greatest in its application to the highest metaphysical conceptions.


Cite: ‘Pragmatism’. Term in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), The Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition. Retrieved from http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/pragmatism, 16.12.2014.
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Items in the Bibliography, the Encyclopedia, and the Working Papers tagged with 'Pragmatism':
Article in Journal
Agler, D. W., & Durmuş, D. (2013). Christine Ladd-Franklin: Pragmatist Feminist
Monograph
Apel, K. (1981). Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism
Monograph
Arens, E. (1994). The Logic of Pragmatic Thinking: From Peirce to Habermas
Article in Journal
Bergman, M. (2011). Beyond the Interaction Paradigm? Radical Constructivism, Universal Pragmatics, and Peircean Pragmatism
Article in Journal
Brooks, T. (2009). A Critique of Pragmatism and Deliberative Democracy
Article in Journal
Campos, D. G. (2010). El Pragmatismo
Monograph
Case, K. (2011). American Pragmatism and Poetic Practice: Crosscurrents from Emerson to Susan Howe
Monograph
de Waal, C. (2013). Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed
Article in Journal
Dea, S. (2014). Peirce and Spinoza's Pragmaticist Metaphysics
Article in Journal
Espinoza, A. (2014). Interpretación Pragmática de los Sistemas de Creencias en Hume y Peirce
Monograph
Fontrodona, J. (2002). Pragmatism and Management Inquiry: Insights from the Thought of Charles S. Peirce
Monograph
Forster, P. (2011). Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism
Encyclopedia Article
Freadman, A. (2001). The Classifications of Signs (II): 1903
Monograph
Gava, G. (2014). Peirce's Account of Purposefulness: A Kantian Perspective
Monograph
Hookway, C. (2012). The Pragmatic Maxim: Essays on Peirce and Pragmatism
Article in Edited Collection
Article in Journal
Klein, A. (2013). Who is in the Community of Inquiry?
Monograph
Misak, C. (2000). Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation
Article in Journal
Misak, C. (2011). 2011 Presidential Address: American Pragmatism and Indispensability Arguments
Article in Journal
Misak, C. (2013). Reply to Four Instructive Critics
Manuscript
Peirce, C. S. (1903). C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd Draught of 3rd Lecture (MS [R] 462)
Manuscript
Peirce, C. S. (1903). Lecture I [R] (MS [R] 453)
Manuscript
Peirce, C. S. (1905). The Bed-Rock Beneath Pragmaticism (MS [R] 300)
Article in Journal
Ramberg, B. T. (2013). Being Constructive: On Misak's Creation of Pragmatism
Article in Journal
Richardson, A. (2013). What Good is a (Indeed, This) History of Pragmatism?
Encyclopedia Article
Rosenthal, S. (2001). Idealism and the Elusiveness of a Peircean Label
Encyclopedia Article
Rosenthal, S. (2001). World and Its Bi-Polar Dimensions
Monograph
Talisse, R. B. (2007). A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy
Article in Journal
Talisse, R. B. (2009). Precis of A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy
Article in Journal
Talisse, R. B. (2013). Recovering American Philosophy
Article in Journal
Tashev, A. (2013). The two pragmatisms in the philosophy of Ivan Sarailiev
Monograph
Thompson, M. (1953). The Pragmatic Philosophy of C. S. Peirce
Monograph
Tiercelin, C. (2013). C. S. Peirce et le pragmatisme
Article in Journal
Van Hollebeke, M. H. (2009). Through "Thick" and "Thin" : Concerns about Talisse's Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy
Article in Journal
White, R. (2013). Pragmatism after Humanism: Peirce, Rorty, and Realism
Encyclopedia Article
Wirth, U. (2001). Abductive Inference and Literary Theory – Pragmatism, Hermeneutics and Semiotics